Level of Public Participation and Support

If the forces of mass mobilization in collective behavior constitute an important topic in social movement theory, an important feature of the January demonstrations is the high level of public participation. The survey results in Figure 6.1 show that about 25.5 percent of the 610 respondents indicated attending the January protests at some point and that about 16 percent said that they attended repeatedly. Given a 95 percent confidence level (25.5 + 3.5 percent) and given a total adult population of the Reykjavík metropolitan area of about 151,000,³ the findings indicate that between 33,200 and 43,800 individuals attended the January protests.⁴ Moreover, Figure 6.2 shows that about 56 percent of the respondents were in favor of the protesters’ activities, while a little less than one-quarter of the respondents were opposed to the actions of the protestors.

Figure 6.1. Rate of public participation in the January demonstrations

Forces of Mobilization after the Economic Meltdown

Having confirmed the high level of public mobilization and support for the protests, we can now ask how the financial crash caused so much social movement activity. In particular, what forces influenced the decisions of individuals to participate in it? I explore three processes: relative deprivation, framing, and political opportunity.

Relative Economic Deprivation

The concept of relative deprivation refers to the perception of unfair disadvantage compared with a reference point that is salient to the individual—for example, compared with others in society or with one’s own situation at another point in time (Ragnarsdóttir, Bernburg, and Ólafsdóttir 2013; Crosby 1976; Runciman 1966). While the concept is used mostly to focus on emotional and health problems (Smith et al. 2012; Bernburg, Thorlindsson, and Sigfusdottir 2009), scholars have argued that relative deprivation can create a fertile ground for revolt. Davies (1962) argues that public revolts often occur after a large-scale backlash, such as an economic crisis, that has put a prolonged period of rising prosperity to a sudden end. Proposing a social-psychological explanation for this pattern, Davies argues that in long periods of prosperity (economic or political) people’s expectations and goals rise, and thus when a severe crisis suddenly ends the prosperity period, many individuals experience shattered expectations and blocked goals, resulting in widespread frustration and a sense of injustice, creating a fertile ground for public revolt.

The Icelandic protests occurred in such a “daviesian” historical circumstance. From 1993 up to the bank crash, the Icelandic economy was characterized by growth and huge increases in the standard of living (see Palsson and Durrenberger, this volume). Public opinion polls from 2007, the year preceding the crisis, show a historical peak in economic expectations among Icelanders (see Ragnarsdóttir, Bernburg, and Ólafsdóttir 2013). The high expectations were shattered by the sudden bankruptcy of the Icelandic banks in October 2008 (Benediktsdóttir, Daníelsson, and Zoega 2011; Matthíasson 2008). Suddenly the Icelandic public faced a severe economic downturn. In a matter of hours, the Icelandic Stock Exchange was wiped out, with huge losses for most investors, businesses, and owners of capital. Homeowners saw the value of their homes depreciate, while at the same time mortgages rose due to inflation. Many businesses suddenly faced the threat of bankruptcy, leading to group layoffs and widespread salary reductions. The Icelandic currency fell more than 95 percent against the dollar, and Iceland became the first developed country to require assistance from the International Monetary Fund in thirty years. Economic expectations reached a historical low point in opinion polls (Ragnarsdóttir, Bernburg, and Ólafsdóttir 2013).

Although the historical context triggering the Reykjavík protests rings true to Davies’s thesis, a historical account cannot suffice in demonstrating the mobilizing role of relative deprivation. We know that economic crises often create emotional problems for individuals (Tausig and Fenwick 1999). Ragnarsdóttir, Bernburg, and Ólafsdóttir (2013) found that Icelanders who experienced a reduced standard of living due to the crisis experienced more emotional distress and were also more likely to perceive their social status as unjust. But even if subjective financial deprivation due to a crisis creates emotional distress, it may or may not make individuals rebellious, or, more specifically, it may or may not have motivated people to participate in the Reykjavík protests. Davies did not use individual data in his comparative research, and in fact the theory has rarely been tested with systematic individual-level data collected in the appropriate historical circumstance.

The Icelandic meltdown provides an opportunity to examine Davies’s theory. The theory implies that individuals who either had experienced or thought they were about to experience a reduction in their standard of living prior to the Reykjavík demonstrations should be more likely to participate in and support the protests. My survey data can be used to explore this hypothesis, although the data are not ideal for this purpose. The survey respondents were asked if they believed that their economic standard of living was better, the same, or worse than it had been prior to the economic crisis of October 2008. Since the survey was conducted several months after the demonstrations (November 2009 through May 2010), it does not tackle the individual’s experience of economic loss prior to the demonstrations but rather several months later. This is a strength in that the question then tackles experienced as well as anticipated deprivation at the time of the protests (both of which should motivate revolt, according to Davies’s theory). But it is also a weakness since some individuals experiencing a reduction in their standard of living at the time of the survey may not have anticipated it at the time of the demonstrations, a random measurement error leading to an underestimation of the “true” effect of this measure.

Despite this limitation, the data support the hypothesis. Figure 6.3 shows protest support and participation by level of subjective reduction in the standard of living at the time of the survey. A positive association appears between subjective economic deprivation on the one hand and protest participation and support on the other hand. Individuals who have experienced a reduction in their economic standard of living are significantly more likely to have participated in the demonstrations (p < .05), and they are significantly more likely to have been in favor of them (p < .05). But, these effects are modest. Thus, the participation rate among those who indicated that their standard of living was no worse than it was before the crisis is about 21 percent, while it is 31 percent among those experiencing a high degree of reduction in their standard of living. Comparable percentages for protest support are 48 and 62 percent, respectively.

Figure 6.3. Rate of participation in/support for the January demonstrations by level of subjective reduction in economic standard of living during the economic crisis (p < .05)

Thus, while the widely shared experience of economic loss appears to have been a mobilizing force in the protests, the weakness of the effect suggests that other forces also played important roles. Indeed, as Zagorin (1973, 44) argues, “a very long distance separates discontent from revolution.” To understand how personal discontent can lead to revolt, we need to consider the interplay of individual discontent and the broader social context of “conflicts and changes in the political system, the emergence of ideologies, and the like.” In what follows, I attend to such processes.

Framing Processes

The framing approach emphasizes the role of interpretive orientations or “frames” in mobilizing individuals in participating in collective action (Snow et al. 1986; Zald 1996). Individuals participate in collective action only if they share a set of definitions that motivate and legitimate such activity, and hence a key to explaining mobilization is to study processes of framing (e.g., Oberschall 1996). This approach implies that even widespread grievances caused by relative deprivation due to a crisis will not trigger collective action against the authorities unless these experiences are framed in a way that motivates such action.

The framing approach focuses our attention to what Snow et al. (1986) refer to as “frame alignment processes,” that is, strategies that social movement agents use to influence individuals’ frames to gain their support and participation (see McAdam 1996). For example, they may use “frame bridging”; that is, they may appeal to values and beliefs that already exist in the society, claiming to provide a way to realize these values and beliefs. They may also use “frame amplification”; that is, they may amplify existing values or beliefs by clarifying or invigorating “an interpretative frame that bears on a particular issue, problem, or set of events” (Snow et al. 1986, 467), for example, by amplifying belief in the seriousness of a particular problem or in the efficacy or timeliness of collective action.

Examining the framing efforts of those who spoke on the part of the antigovernment movement may help to explain how the crisis ended up triggering mass protests. An examination of the speeches held at the protest meetings in the fall of 2008 and early January 2009, as well as articles and blogs written by the movement spokespeople during this period, shows attempts to frame the economic crisis as a “moral shock” (Jasper and Poulsen 1995). Specifically, the crisis was said to have revealed (1) the problem of political corruption in Iceland, (2) the problems of unfettered neoliberalism, and (3) the necessity, timeliness, and feasibility of antigovernment collective action demanding democratic reform. I will briefly discuss each of these themes.

Contrary to statements made by government leaders that factors external to the government (i.e., global market forces and the reckless behavior of business leaders and bankers) were to blame for the economic crisis and its effects on the Icelandic public, spokespeople of the protest movement framed the crisis as a problem caused by local factors, namely, failures in Icelandic politics. Specifically, they emphasized two flaws. First, they argued that Icelandic politics were corrupt and plagued by political nepotism that had created widespread incompetence in government and public administration. Moreover, they argued that strong connections between politics and business gave much power to “special interests” and “the rich.” A known government critic and public intellectual stated in a speech a few weeks after the financial collapse:

Thus corruption in Icelandic politics had undermined democratic principles, leading to decisions and policies that went against public interests and resulting in the extreme effects of the global economic crisis in Iceland.

The majority of movement spokespeople expressed a strongly “left-wing” political stance. They framed the economic crisis as proof that the “invisible hand” policy of free market liberalism was wrong for the country and needed to be replaced by something else. Many movement spokespeople blamed the Independence Party–led government (a large right-wing party that had led Icelandic governments since the early 1990s) for the severity of the economic crisis. By deregulating the market and implementing free market and neoliberalist policies, the government had allowed the financial sector to run wild in the years leading up to the crisis. Although the new policies created rapid economic progress, they also greatly destabilized the Icelandic economy and made it extremely vulnerable during the crash. According to movement spokespeople, the government’s neoliberalist policies had been proven wrong, and therefore the ruling government needed to step down from power.

Finally, movement spokespeople emphasized the moral necessity, timeliness, and effectiveness of antigovernment collective action. Due to the widespread system failure, a new society could now be built on “democratic” principles (as opposed to corruption and neoliberalism). These voices became more radicalized in the weeks following the bank crash, especially as it became clear that the government leaders were not going to step down from power. Movement leaders urged collective action, claiming that only through public protests would the political leaders be held accountable for their actions and be forced to resign. New elections and democratic reform could happen only if new people took over.

Did these framing efforts motivate Icelanders to support and participate in the protests? Again, my survey data can be used to examine hypotheses about protest support and participation. First, to measure perceived political corruption, survey respondents were asked about their belief in the importance of having “political connections” to “get ahead in Icelandic society.” The results in Figure 6.4 show that the perception of political corruption is significantly associated with both protest support (p < .05) and participation (p < .05). Those who strongly believed that political connections are needed to get ahead in society were more than twice as likely to participate in the demonstrations than those who did not have this belief, and they were somewhat more likely to support the protests. Thus, framing the crisis as a consequence of political corruption seems to have motivated many of those aligned with such framing to support and participate in the demonstrations. Other surveys have also found dissatisfaction with Icelandic politics to play a role in the protests (Önnudóttir 2011).

Figure 6.4. Rate of participation in/support for the January demonstrations by level of perceived political corruption (p < .05)

Second, Figure 6.5 shows a strong association between political orientation on the one hand and protest support (p < .05) and participation on the other hand (p < .05). Individuals who had a left-wing political orientation were about 2.4 times more likely to participate in the protests than those with a right-wing orientation, and they were almost twice as likely than right-wingers to support the demonstrations. The antigovernment protests seem to have gained momentum in part because movement agents successfully framed the crisis as revealing the failure of neoliberalism, thus mobilizing the large numbers of individuals who had a left-wing political orientation to participate in and support the demonstrations.

Figure 6.5. Rate of participation in/support for the January demonstrations by political orientation ( p < .05)

Political Opportunity

I finally explore how the financial crisis in Iceland inspired and facilitated the framing efforts, making them so effective in mobilization. The political opportunity perspective emphasizes that changes in some aspects of the political system, such as power relations, elite alliances, shifts in public opinion, and so on, can create opportunities for collective action. But, as McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996, 8) have argued, whether or not such openings actually lead to collective action is dependent on other factors, including framing processes: “Most political movements and revolutions are set in motion by social changes that render the established political order more vulnerable or receptive to challenge . . . [But] such changes only become an ‘opportunity’ when defined as such by a group of actors sufficiently well organized to act on this shared definition of the situation.” Thus, political or social changes trigger mobilization “not only through the ‘objective’ effects they have on power relations, but by setting in motion framing processes that further undermine the legitimacy of the system or its perceived mutability.”

The economic crisis created opportunities for the successful antigovernment framing due to the historical convergence of several factors. First of all, the way in which the economic crisis struck Iceland created a collectively shared national disaster. On October 6, 2008, six days after a sudden government takeover of Glitnir Bank, the first of the three largest banks in Iceland to go bankrupt, Landsbankinn, the second bank to fail, went bankrupt. On that day, in a dramatic and highly unusual special national broadcast, Prime Minister Geir Haarde declared a state of national emergency, informing the nation about the necessity of placing special emergency laws making the state responsible for the public’s money in the failing banks. He ended the broadcast on the now famous words “God bless Iceland!” Suddenly the general public in one of the most affluent democracies in the world was in a state of panic, fear, and desperation about its economic future. That night Icelanders went to bed not knowing if they would be able to withdraw money from the banks the following morning. Later that week the third and largest bank, Kaupthing Bank, went bankrupt. About 85 percent of the Icelandic banking system had gone bankrupt in a period of ten days.

The emotionally charged and collectively shared focus of the public on the economic crisis provided a fertile ground for collective action. At the outset the financial crisis was particularly harmful to the middle and upper classes, society’s “mainstream,” who lost a lot when the banks failed. For several weeks and months following the bank crash, the unfolding economic crisis had the full attention of the Icelandic media as well as the public. If media attention is essential to mass mobilization (Andrews and Biggs 2006; Klandermans and Goslinga 1996; McCarthy, Smith, and Zald 1996), the Icelandic media paved the way for the protest movement by constantly delivering news and analyses about the alleged local causes of the crisis as well as the country’s bleak economic future. The shared national focus on the financial collapse, along with the public’s confusion, anxiety, and disappointment, gave public speakers who interpreted the events a tremendous amount of publicity in the media as well as widespread public attention and enthusiasm.

Associated with this shared traumatic experience were particular issues or “scandals” that surfaced and were particularly conducive for framing the crisis as a consequence of government failure (for details of these scandals, see Benediktsdóttir et al. 2011). The Icelandic public learned at the onset of the crisis that the three largest banks in Iceland, all former state banks that had been privatized a few years earlier, had been allowed to grow immensely, becoming more than ten times the size of Iceland’s GDP, while at the same time the Icelandic state continued to be liable for large parts of the banks’ actual and anticipated losses. From the public’s perspective, the government, under the leadership of the conservative right-wing party that had been in power since the early 1990s, seemed to have made serious mistakes by failing to regulate and control the financial sector, for which it was ultimately liable. Moreover, at this point Iceland’s economy appeared to have been hit much harder by the global financial crisis than any other country, giving much leverage to a “local problem” framing. From the point of view of public opinion, the ruling government was in an extremely vulnerable position.

The two key features of the financial crisis—the shared, emotionally charged focus on the economic crisis, along with the revelations about the state’s liability of the overgrown banks—created leverage for dissidents to influence public opinion by amplifying well-established themes of social and political critique of ruling political powers. Dissidents and critics of the ruling political powers successfully framed the crisis as a “moral shock” (Jasper and Poulsen 1995), mobilizing large number of individuals who were receptive to these views.

Discussion and Conclusion

The current analysis is a first step toward a comprehensive understanding of the forces behind the Icelandic protests. Further research should explore other factors that likely influenced the mobilization process. The actions and reactions of government leaders influence the occurrence of revolt (Skocpol 1979), and the reactions of the government leaders in Iceland likely played an important role in the creation of political opportunity. Their refusal to accept responsibility for the crisis and their refusal to step down gave the protest movement a goal resonating well with the public’s notions of the democratic process, namely, to demand new elections. Indeed, the momentum of mass mobilization vanished immediately after the ruling government resigned, despite the willingness of frontline protesters and movement leaders to continue the protests and demand democratic reform.

Also, the role of organized activists and radical groups in the mobilization efforts and in amplifying the protests themselves needs to be explored. As part of a global phenomenon (see Nash 2005), an activist tradition rooted in an ideology of discontent and opposition to neoliberalist developments had been emerging in Iceland during the decade leading up to the crisis. Activist groups already had experience with organizing small-scale protests against big (transnational) industry in Iceland’s wilderness. Like other dissidents of the ruling political establishment, these groups saw the economic crisis as an opportunity for mass mobilization against neoliberalism, and it is clear from historical accounts that young radicals played a highly visible role at the protests. Radical groups may also have played a key role in providing an organizational base for the protest events. Further research needs to be done to determine the role of such groups.

The pivotal role of the media in Iceland in creating political opportunity needs to be explored. The media played a key role not only in focusing the nation on the crisis as well as on the protests and citizen’s meetings taking place in the fall of 2008 and in January 2009 but also in reporting on the scandals associated with the crisis, which in turn became the raw material for the framing of the crisis as a moral shock revealing the need for democratic reform. Future research should examine how social movement agents gained media attention for their framing efforts (McAdam 1996).

In conclusion, the widespread public support for and participation in the Icelandic protests underscore that in times of crisis collective action can become a serious challenge to the political establishment, even in a contemporary democratic society, just as it has been at various critical points in the history of modernizing societies. The protests demonstrate how economic crisis can produce fertile ground for collective action by creating not only widespread economic grievances but also political opportunities for successful collective action framing.

The preparation of this chapter was aided by grants from the Icelandic Centre for Research, EDDA—Center of Excellence, and the University of Iceland Research Fund. The author thanks Linda Björk Pálmadóttir for her assistance in obtaining historical material.